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ing with the farmer's calendar; but the fact is too important for us to pass it by in this connection,—since, to emphasize solely the practical advantages of the solar year over the lunar as the reason for its adoption would be an unhistorical injection of the modern point of view into antiquity. We must never forget that luck is the most practical thing in the world—if one believes in it. Hence the reckoning of solar years was also largely a religious matter. The one advantage it had was that it coincided as well with the laws of work as with those of belief.

The one country which led all the others in the adoption of the solar year was Egypt. And it was incomparably in the lead. Already in the fourth or fifth millenium B.C. the year in Egypt consisted of 365 days, and the months ceased to correspond with the movements of the moon and became divisions of solar time—or what the Egyptians imagined was solar time. Twelve months of thirty days each, with five days added at the end, made up the year. Some traces of the old moon cults were left in the calendar, as, for example, the festival on the first and the fifteenth, which apparently corresponded with the old, new, and full-moon festivals. But these indications of the universal primitive outlook were in Egypt quite overshadowed by the cycle of the great Sun-god, the king of heaven, known to the Egyptians as Re, Atum or Horus, with whom the River-god, the life-giving Osiris, was indissolubly bound by the tangle of mythology. But the supernatural calendar really depended, in the most transparent way, upon the natural.³¹

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(To be continued.)

PROFESSOR ADAMS AND THE KNOT OF KNOWLEDGE

IT should have been a trilemma at least which Professor Adams set himself to solve in his recent article,¹ for while it is not exactly clear in what essential historic positions his dilemma consists, and granting that the apparent opposition between realism and subjectivism has been stated correctly, there should still be considered the position of Richard Avenarius, Empirio-Criticism.

³¹ Cf. J. H. Breasted, "The Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt" (1912), Lecture I. This was the first attempt to apply the Pyramid Texts to the understanding of Egyptian religion.

¹ "The Mind's Knowledge of Reality," George P. Adams, this JOURNAL, Vol. III., page 57.

One wonders a little that a view so clearly different from any mentioned in current debates should be so neglected. Contemptible it certainly is not; and whatever be men's disagreements with Avenarius, they have never despised his ability.

Professor Adams states in a note² that he will later discuss a type of dualistic realism, but he seems to have dualism in mind all the while; indeed, if he be not himself a dualist, many of his expressions are ill chosen, while it is clear that he announces himself as an idealist of the absolute type and his defense of a *priorism* would certainly indicate it.

The first (apparent) form of the dilemma³ is that "unless at some place the mind faces real being directly and immediately and knows that this, its possession, is indeed knowledge, then no knowledge can ever be acquired." Again:⁴ "In order that knowledge shall exist, some direct contact of mind and real world there must be in order to teach the mind what it means to be real. At some place there must be some knowledge which is positive and direct, standing on its own feet. *So much we accept from realism.*" The other horn of the dilemma seems to be pure subjectivism which needs no further definition; but one reader at least is confused in his mind, after a careful study of the article, to determine whether or no Professor Adams describes both of the horns of his dilemma as immediacy,⁵ whereas the first horn would seem to imply a plain dualism.

There does not seem to me to be a real dilemma here. We are not shut up to one view or the other of these two. There are many variants, even without seeking refuge in the bosom of the absolute. Moreover it appears to be pure dogmatism to say that knowledge must have a beginning and that that beginning must be knowledge!

Three types of knowledge are cited to illustrate the dilemma, "*i. e.*, knowledge of past time, of other minds, and of the grouping or classification of objects in our world."⁶ The author finds satisfactory evidence of a *priority* in the first and third, but is distressed about the second. It is impossible to accept⁷ "the paradoxical thesis that I may have as direct an experience of another's mind as of my own." Why "paradoxical"? Surely it is accepted and obvious that knowledge of my mind as *mine* is coincident with the recognition of the mind of another; and, if I know both, they are both known directly. The Cartesian *cogito* is surely to be found only in the

² *Op. cit.*, page 63.

³ *Ibid.*, page 57.

⁴ *Ibid.*, page 62. Italics mine.

⁵ *Ibid.*, page 61.

⁶ *Ibid.*, page 58.

⁷ *Ibid.*, page 59.

scrap-heap to-day. The ego-centric situation is indeed fundamental, but the ego-socius experience, knowledge, is equally fundamental and the subject-object relation, and a thousand others.

I am not concerned with Professor Adams's main thesis, which is a defense of a *priorism*. There is no need to seek that *dernier ressort* until Avenarianism has at least been tried. Within the limits of this brief protest I can only insist dogmatically upon the points at which Avenarianism differs from neutral (monistic) realism (or, for that matter, from dualistic realism) and also from subjectivism. A full account of this philosophy exists elsewhere, though not generally accessible.⁸

First, then, for Avenarius experience does not imply an experiencer. The word *Erfahrung* is inevitably retained in his philosophy, but he has clearly defended it from the charge of such implication.⁹ Quarrel with his use of the word if you will; his meaning is clear.

Second, there is no priority, logical or temporal, of any self. Experience is a unitary whole which is gradually differentiated into the manifold which we, in sophistication, call the world. In this differentiation there arises a class of beings to which we attribute the power of *knowing* things; but this is, after all, a usage of popular speech only. Knowledge is a fact among other facts—like a mountain or blue or sweet or unpleasant; and the epistemological situation is itself a fact which, within its own bounds, may be split up into knower and known, but which, considered as a whole, is simply *there*. The simplest type of knowledge does not know that it is knowledge. It is not an ingrowing consciousness! When knowledge itself becomes the object of knowledge there is further sophistication or complexity, but no Cartesian dualism.

Third, all things get their denotation and then their characterization through contrast: and nothing develops alone.

Fourth, the self is also object of experience, but, I insist, following Avenarius, not to an experiencer. It simply is; and it is not some transcendental unity of apperception, it is not the subject of *cogito*, it is rather an *order of things* which may and do stand in other orders and form parts of other selves. The self, for Avenarius, is but the *content* of the manifold expressions, utterances (*Aussagen*) of the organism reacting to external stimuli. Now a part of that contact may be (*is*, for me now writing) the fountain pen which I use which is equally an integral part of the furniture of my desk and may become a part of your *self*.

⁸ "The Philosophy of Richard Avenarius: The Nature of Cognition in a Philosophy of Pure Experience"—my own doctoral thesis in the Harvard Library.

⁹ "Der Menschliche Weltbegriff," Paragraph 6.

Fifth, for Avenarius the ontological problem of the stuff of the universe does not exist. There is no one stuff. That stuff is whatever it is; and what is now mental may become physical, and *vice versa*.

And lastly, all things may be considered to be a function of time and space.

I have never studied any philosophy to which valid exception could not be taken; but none of any importance has failed to contribute some vision of the eventual truth. This is so of Avenarianism. Professor Montague, in the "New Realism," criticizing pan-psychism, has incidentally dealt a heavy blow to Avenarianism; but that is another story.

I insist upon my Trilemma.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

A History of Philosophy. FRANK THILLY. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1914. xvi + 612.

One of the distinguishing merits of this new general history lies in its apportionment of space among the periods of European thought. Most of the manuals in common use are excellently calculated to give the student or general reader the impression that philosophical thought in the Occident was a vein that "petered out" about 1860, if not, indeed, in 1830 or at a yet earlier date. An examination of the relative amount of space given to contemporary philosophy in six of the best of the other one-volume histories shows a maximum of two per cent., and in most of the books merely "traces"; while the entire record of post-Kantian reflection fills only from nine to nineteen per cent. of the contents of these works. In Professor Thilly's volume the period since Kant receives about twenty-eight per cent. of the whole space; and some fifty pages, or eight per cent., are devoted to a skilfully compact exposition of recent and contemporary tendencies. There are, no doubt, those who will see in this a too generous estimate of the importance of the moderns. But a study of the history of philosophy which leaves the student *planté là* amid the philosophic problems of his grandparents, instead of introducing him to the thoughts and questionings of his own age, is surely an especially bad instance of that *semerophobia*, or terror of the contemporaneous, which is one of the infirmities of the academic mind. Earlier philosophy is a good deal more than an introduction to recent philosophy, but it is that among other things, and this aspect of it is one which especially needs to be emphasized; scarcely anything could be worse for the study than that it should have the appearance of being essentially a branch of archeology. It is to be hoped that Professor Thilly's example in this